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On March 30 1898, President McKinley wept while telling 
a colleague of Congress7 attempt to force the U.S. into the 
Spanish-American War. In a span of six weeks, beginning with the 
sinking of the Maine in Havana harbor, popular fervor had swelled 
for an assertion of strength and courage befitting an emergent 
world power. Yet, even after formal investigations revealed that 
an external mine had triggered the explosion, McKinley continued 
to advocate restraint in addressing the delicate situation in Cuba. 
After months of spirited debate between dovish arbitrationists and 
their jingoist counterparts, the latter succeeded in portraying 
McKinley’s deliberation as a deficiency of backbone. The curious 
emphasis upon backbone epitomized the President as lacking a 
decisive, forceful character, capable of enacting its will.1 Popular 
criticism mounted, citing a lack of “manhood in the White House”
<2
that rendered its leadership “lame, halting, and impotent.” 
McKinley took the critique to heart while Congress heeded the 
nation’s call for war.
o
But not all of the spin was critical of McKinley’s reluctance 
to act. His supporters staked the high ground, stressing the 
President’s “great calmness” as superior to the jingoists’ desire for 
“passion” and “revenge.” Numerous arbitrationists applauded
1 Kristin Hoganson, Fighting fo r  American Manhood: How Gender Politics 
Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars, (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1998): 105, 90-2.
1
McKinley’s “firmness and strength of character” as dignified and 
statesmanlike.3 For those still doubting McKinley’s deliberate 
tack, advocates touted his “splendid record” as Civil War soldier in 
further defense of his manhood and integrity.4 Despite these 
efforts, McKinley’s abiding concern for public opinion, coupled 
with a fear of relinquishing control to Congress, led him to declare 
war on April 25 to the approval of Capitol Hill and the nation at 
large. Thus, after weeks of painful speculation in which he saw his 
manhood and the political power of his nation placed under siege, 
the exhausted President relented. But McKinley’s acquiescence 
was not an admission of cowardice; rather, it was a rational 
accommodation of the changing climate he confronted.5
Why were men like McKinley so disconcerted by the 
media campaigns preceding the Spanish-American War? It may 
seem rash to affix a single answer to this loaded question. 
Nonetheless, there is one explanation that warrants detailed 
consideration. Throughout the final decades of the nineteenth 
century there was a crisis of manhood that transformed the male 
ideal in America. Gail Bederman, in Manliness and Civilization, 
credits this period with effecting a shift from the term “manliness” 
to “masculinity” in characterizing turn-of -the-century manhood.
2 “Dollars versus Democracy,” New York Journal, March 8, 1898; Sen. George 
Turner, Congressional Record, 31, pt. 4, April 14, 1898, 3827.
3 “Keeping Cool,” Baltimore Sun, March 1, 1898.
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The former implied a moral dimension of manhood as an 
“honorable, highminded” ideal rooted in the Victorian attributes of 
sexual restraint, a powerful will, and a strong character. The 
emergent masculine ideal, by contrast, represented the 
“characteristics o f the male sex” that differentiated men from 
women. Beginning in the final decades of the nineteenth century, 
this evolution of convention yielded a male standard that 
increasingly embraced “aggressiveness, physical force, and male 
sexuality.” Thus McKinley, representing the manly ideal of the 
Civil War generation, encountered profound opposition from a 
new generation that espoused a masculine ideal rooted in more 
virile demonstrations o f manhood. As such, the assaults upon the 
President’s manhood, viewed in the context of a changing male 
paradigm, made war almost imperative to his effective leadership.6
Developments in the final decades of the nineteenth century 
-the closing of the frontier, unprecedented immigration and the 
emergence of industrial capitalism, and the advent of imperial
4 “The President’s Detainers,” Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, March 9, 
1898.
5 Hoganson, American Manhood, 106.
6 The Century Dictionary: An Encyclopedic Lexicon of the English Language 
(Century: New York, 1890), s.w . “masculine,” “manly.” Going a step ftirther, 
Bederman’s use of masculine to describe tum-of-the-century manhood is 
invoked to differentiate between those things pertaining to men versus women, 
for example, “masculine clothing,” a “masculine gait,” or “masculine 
occupations.” The term therefore exists as a “relatively empty, fluid adjective 
devoid o f moral or emotional meaning,” as quoted in Gail Bederman, Manliness 
and Civilization: A Cultural History o f  Gender and Race in the United States, 
1880-1917, (Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1995): 18-19. The term 
manhood, for the purposes of this paper will be used as a neutral reference to the
3
conquest— comprised the defining challenges of the young nation.7 
Scholars like Bederman have recognized that a cross-over from 
manly to masculine manhood took place throughout this period, 
but explanations for how it happened have been conspicuously 
lacking. To help fill this void, I will explain how the
aforementioned challenges formed a nexus whereby masculinity
(
supplanted manliness in the psyche of American men. In charting 
this transformation, I will explore how (1) anxiety wrought by the 
closing of the frontier and (2) a changing political framework, 
served to alienate men from past constructions of manhood. In 
light of these breaks from standards of manliness, I will conclude 
by trying to demonstrate how this shift placed men, increasingly, 
on a masculine trajectory of aggressive resistance to women’s 
assertiveness, which emerged with greater scope and frequency at 
the turn-of-the-century.
Post-Frontier Anxiety
When Frederick Jackson Turner announced the closing of 
the American frontier to an assembly of historians at the 1893 
Columbian Exposition in Chicago, he merely formalized what
male experience bereft of the connotations attributed to manly and masculine, as 
set forth in my thesis.
7 John Whiteclay Chambers II, The Tyranny o f  Change: Am erica in the 
Progressive Era, 1890-1920, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992): 49.
4
many scholars of his day already knew.8 By proceeding to attach 
to the bygone frontier an end to “the first period of American 
history,” however, he prompted his countrymen to think more 
seriously of what the event boded for the nation’s future. In an era 
of economic and political strife, Turner’s formal interpretation of 
the 1890 census returns gave definition to a post-frontier anxiety 
emergent in the final decades of the nineteenth century. For 
Turner and like-minded scholars, the settlement of the frontier 
provided the key to America’s favorable development -  “to the 
evolution of American democracy.” As such, the frontier became 
the cornerstone of American exceptionalism, just as its closing 
concluded a unique chapter in the nation’s emergence.9
Turner believed that the frontier experience imparted the 
defining traits of democracy. The process of western settlement,
8 Billington, Ray Allen. Am erica’s Frontier Heritage (Hinsdale: The Dryden 
Press, 1966): 4-13. A brief qualification of my use of the term “frontier”: Since 
the publication in 1894 of Turner’s monumental essay, “The Significance of the 
Frontier in American History,” the meaning of the term frontier has become a 
matter of profound importance to historians of the American West. Turner’s 
interpretation of the frontier experience, largely devoid of political conflict, 
heralded American democracy and egalitarianism as paragons of human 
progress. More recently, however, New Western Historian Patricia Limerick 
has rejected the term altogether, asserting that when precisely defined, the term 
is nationalistic and racist as it denotes regions where “white people get scarce.” 
This criticism has helped supplant Turner’s idealized conception of the 
American frontier by “admitting the hierarchies of indenture, slavery, and class 
differentiation” that accompanied America’s westward expansion. Trails: 
Toward a New Western History, ed. Patricia Limerick, Charles Rankin, and 
Clyde A. Milner II, (University Press o f Kansas, 1991). Despite the welcome 
complications posed by intervening scholarship, the term remains essential to 
my purposes as it assists in developing the historical dialogue especially 
important to the first portion of this paper.
9 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History, (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1976): 38. David M. Wrobel, The End o f  American
5
Turner contended, “master[ed] the colonist.” To appreciate this 
advance -“the men who grew up under these conditions, and the 
political, economic and social results of it”- was to appreciate the 
truly American part of the nation’s history. 10 In short, by 
adapting to the material realities of the frontier, Americans became 
a new cultural species as “organs in response” to a novel 
environment, free from historical imitation.11 For Turner, then, the 
frontier provided the unique stage upon which Americans learned 
their most defining and noble characteristics.
The importance of the frontier to the nation’s development 
brought a corresponding fear of its pending absence. A number of 
social critics feared the looming end of the frontier in the final 
decades of the century and the theme permeated the periodical 
literature of the time. The Nation noted the danger as early as 
1880: “The great progress of this country has taken place within 
the past twenty years, owing to the rapid settlement and cultivation 
of Western lands; and we have been going on as if there were to be 
no exhaustion of the impelling force.” With the rapid 
disappearance of land, the editorial continued: “At the present rate
Exceptionalism: Frontier Anxiety from  the Old West to the New Deal, 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993): vii-viii, 3-5.
10 Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American 
History, ” Proceedings o f  the Forty-First Annual M eeting o f  the State Historical 
Society o f  Wisconsin (Madison, Wis., 1894): 81-2.
11 Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Problem of the West.” The Frontier in 
American History, (Huntington: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1976): 
205-6.
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of settlement the desirable free ‘homestead’ lands will probably all 
be occupied before this decade has ended.”12
This alarm continued into the 1890s when, just prior to
Turner’s proclamation, C. Wood Davis asked more specifically
what the closing of the frontier meant to the anxious nation:
When we reflect that the prime factor in the unexampled prosperity 
of the United States, and our comparative freedom from many of 
the social and economic problems long confronting Europe, has 
been the existence of an almost unlimited area of fertile land to 
which the unemployed could freely resort; that, practically, such 
lands are now fully occupied, and that such occupancy has 
occasioned a sudden halt in the westward movement of population 
at the line found to the extreme western limit of profitable 
agriculture, it may be well to inquire what changes are likely to 
result from the exhaustion of the tillable portion of the public 
domain.13
For Davis, as for others, the imminent passing of the frontier and 
its ameliorative function prompted widespread concern. Thus, by 
the time of Turner’s emergence a profound anxiety regarding the 
nation’s loss of public lands was already in place.
Initially, Turner was less dour than his predecessors 
regarding what the closing of the frontier meant for America. He 
was convinced that “the legacy of a pioneering spirit of 
competition and individualism would buoy citizens in a frontierless 
America.” Turner cleaved to two elements capable of sustaining 
American democracy in wake of the frontier’s passing. First, the 
moral and political legacy of the frontier had imparted an abiding
12 “An Agricultural Outlook,” The Nation, XXXI (August 19, 1880): 127.
7
ideological consensus, firmly rooted in the democratic ideals of the 
nation. This, Turner contended, would retain the virtues of the 
frontier despite its absence. Second, Turner asserted that the West 
and Midwest, by pursuit of their sectional interests, would preserve 
the frontier as a potent force in representing regional politics.14 In 
this sense, Turner’ s death knell o f the frontier included a eulogy 
that softened the loss of an era deemed critical to America’s 
development.
But Turner’s optimism was soon eclipsed by a widespread 
post-frontier anxiety. The heroes of Turner’s story were not the 
“great captains” or men of “daring,” but rather “the small 
entrepreneurs, artisans, and farmers, the little men in their average 
and aggregate;”15 This broad agency gave the frontier experience 
its distinctly democratic character. Likewise, it sowed the seeds 
for anxiety in the wake of Turner’s proclamation. The close of the 
nineteenth century witnessed widespread depression, mass 
unemployment, and urban decay. American men had always 
celebrated their democratic institutions, but now saw them flouted
13 Lee Benson, Turner and Beard: American Historical Writing Reconsidered  
(Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960): 80.
14 Richard Etulain, Re-Imagining the M odern American West: A  Century o f  
Fiction, History, and Art, (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1996): 49; 
Frederick Jackson Turner, “Contributions of the West,” in The Frontier in 
American History, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962): 246-9; 
“Dominant Forces in Western Life,” ibid., 235-40. It is worth noting that by the 
early twentieth century Turner joined ranks with his more pessimistic colleagues 
in fearing that the “rising urban-industrial United States, with mounting 
bureaucratic centralization” had “broken its frontier moorings” and strayed from 
its “nourishing and positive frontier legacies.” Etulain, Re-Imagining, 49.
by urban boss governments and anarchists. Where they once 
dreamed of an America immune from violent industrial labor 
conflicts, men now confronted a nightmare of railroad strikes 
(1877), the Haymarket Square riot (1886), the Homestead Strike 
(1892), and the Pullman Strike (1894), not to mention western 
confrontations evident in the gold-mining strikes at Coeur d’Alene 
and at Cripple Creek (1892-94), and Coxey’s Army (1894). Thus 
even before he spoke them, Turner’s assurances of the residual 
effect o f the frontier rang hollow.16
With one of the factors that had spurred the nation’s growth 
evaporating, Americans of the late-nineteenth century concluded 
that the other -large-scale immigration— was no longer beneficial. • 
For decades immigrants had proven critical in pushing the frontier 
further west. They fueled railroad and canal construction, supplied 
man-power to nascent industries, and, in general, satisfied the 
country’s demand for unskilled labor. However, as Western 
homesteads grew increasingly scarce and urban decay spread 
throughout the East, nativists increasingly identified their foreign- 
born counterparts as scapegoats for many of the nation’s problems.
This discontent sharpened by the 1880’s and 1890’s in 
response to demographic changes in U.S. immigration that featured
15 Richard Slotkin. Gunfighter Nation: The M yth o f  the Frontier in Twentieth- 
Century America  (New York: Harper Perennial, 1993): 34.
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a swell of southern and eastern Europeans. These “new” 
immigrants troubled many Americans by their perceived 
differences. Generally, they were poorer than their predecessors, 
which exacerbated the decay of urban centers. Likewise, their 
disproportionately Catholic and Jewish composition posed threats 
to an otherwise Protestant society. Moreover, they were largely 
unskilled and uneducated; their ignorance of American convention 
threatened to drive down wages while diluting democratic 
institutions. Above all, they looked different; they were not 
Anglo-Saxons and, as such, they represented a different “race.”17 
It is important to note how the timing of anti-immigration 
hysteria coincided with a widespread anxiety about the 
disappearance of the frontier. In the 1880’s and 1890’s new social, 
economic, and political pressures combined with perceptions of a 
dwindling public domain to prompt concerns regarding the ability 
of America to Americanize its new arrivals. As the issues 
converged, a growing number questioned whether or not an 
unchecked right of immigration represented “an abstract theory” 
for whose sake the country was “sacrificing [its] great advantage of
16 Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind: An Interpretation o f  American 
Thought and Character Since the 1880’s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1950)1:41-54.
17 Maldwyn Allen Jones, American Immigration (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, I960): 37, 178-183, 192-193, 230, 257. For a nuanced treatment 
o f Manifest Destiny in the U.S. as a gradual shift from a celebration of superior 
institutions based on historical innovations of the “Anglo-Saxon” peoples, to 
that of the innate superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race, see Reginald Horsman,
10
elbow room [while] risking [its] national character.”18 This 
confluence gave rise to less democratic solutions to the problems 
confronting the nation, a process that likewise prompted a fresh 
construction of American manhood.
As already suggested, Turner’s frontiersman mirrored 
Jefferson’s husbandman as “the rock upon which the American 
republic [or, in Turner’s case, the democratic ideal] st[ood].” The 
western settler, situated in isolation, embodied Jefferson’s “rural 
virtue” while transforming the wild into the agrarian.19 This model 
approximated the honor-virtue of the manly ideal in mid­
nineteenth century America. By the final decades of the century, 
however, the closing of the frontier and resultant anxieties linked 
to immigration gave way to a more aggressive construction of 
manhood.
Perhaps no one embodied this turn toward masculinity 
better than Teddy Roosevelt. He entered the political scene in 
1882, at age twenty-three, as an assemblyman from Albany, New 
York. Almost immediately, Roosevelt realized that in order to 
play ‘a man’s part’ in politics he would need to overhaul his 
image. Newspapers ridiculed hi's effeminate voice and aristocratic
Race and M anifest Destiny: The Origins o f  American Racial Anglo-Saxonism, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981).
18 John Havvkes Noble, “The Present State of the Immigration Question,” 
Political Science Quarterly, VII (June, 1892): 243.
19 Annette Kolodny, The Lay o f  the Land: M etaphor as Experience and History 
in American Life and Letters, (Chapel Hill: The University o f North Carolina 
Press, 1975): 27.
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dress by contriving aliases such as “weakling,” “Jane-Dandy,” and 
“Punkin-Lily” to stunt his lofty aspirations.20 Undaunted, 
Roosevelt invoked a successful public relations campaign to 
transform his perception as “dude” in becoming the “quintessential 
symbol of turn-of-the century masculinity.” Roosevelt’s 
bildungsroman featured his retreat to South Dakota following the 
tragic death of his wife in 1884 and, more importantly, the 
adoption of a new discourse of civilization, which became a 
hallmark of his political career.
Bederman’s scholarship is of use here. She identifies the 
nineteenth century discourse o f civilization as a highly variable 
dialogue with the potential to serve the interests of numerous social 
groups. At its root, the discourse sought to answer what behaviors 
and assumptions, on the part of individuals and society as a whole, 
were worthy of the term, civilized. Despite its broad potential, 
civilization tended to be construed so as to maintain the class, 
gender, race, and political authority of middle- and upper-class 
white, American men. Nonetheless, because civilization was 
subject to the vicissitudes of a broader dialogue, it became more “a 
process of articulation” than a set of fixed formulations or points. 
Its lack of definition left the discourse open to constant challenge. 
Conservative chauvinists, militant feminists, white racists, and
20 Edmund Morris, The Rise o f  Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Ballantine, 
1979): 159-83; Mark Sullivan, Our Times: The United States 1900-1925 (New
12
black resisters all sought to increase their power by shaping the 
discourse of civilization to best meet their needs. As Bederman 
points out, the importance of civilization was not what it meant so 
much as how participants in its discourse used it to “legitimize” 
wide-ranging claims to power 21
For Roosevelt, civilization’s cultural power derived from 
linking beliefs about gender, race and millennialism. By yoking 
male supremacy to white supremacy and defending both as critical 
to human perfection amidst the Darwinian struggle, civilization 
presented male power as both “natural and inevitable.” Roosevelt 
viewed American men as actors in a millennial drama of 
“advancement” vis a vis their “racial inferiors.” To demonstrate 
this “virility as a race and nation,” Roosevelt implored American 
men to take up the ‘strenuous life’ and strive to advance 
civilization - “through racial violence if necessary.”22 Roosevelt 
fused manliness and masculinity by rendering honor synonymous 
with aggression in spurring American men to wage an international 
battle for “racial supremacy.”
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1927): 226-230.
21 Bederman, M anliness and Civilization, 23.
22 ibid., 23-7, 171. Roosevelt defined the “strenuous life” as a “life of toil and 
effort, of labor and strife; ... that highest form of success which comes, not to the 
man who desires mere easy peace, but to the man who does not shrink from 
danger, from hardship, or from bitter toil, and who out o f these wins the 
splendid ultimate triumph.” Theodore Roosevelt, speech before the Hamilton 
Club, Chicago, April 10, 1899, published in The Strenuous Life: Essays and 
Addresses, (New York: The Century Co., 1911): 1.
23 Bederman, M anliness and Civilization, 25-27; The stakes of Roosevelt’s 
civilization requirement were evident in his later statement: “Courage, hard 
work, self mastery, and intelligent effort are essential to a successful life... Only
13
The frontier of the American West provided the object 
lesson in Roosevelt’s civilization discourse. Whereas Turner’s 
frontier stressed independence in learning manly, democratic 
virtues, Roosevelt’s highlighted the masculine duty to assert one’s 
self on behalf of civilization. The challenge for Roosevelt came in 
linking a legacy of competitive traits to the frontier. He served this 
end, in part, by celebrating the hunt as a metaphor for American 
success. For Roosevelt hunting provided a “training school for 
war,” which honed the frontiersman’s skills and explained his 
success vis a vis the Indians. For Roosevelt, then, the frontier 
ceased to be a mere safety valve and instead became a virile
94proving ground for civilized manhood.
In addition to his ‘race-war’ fantasies, Roosevelt’s 
civilization project contained an explicit class-bias. The social ills 
that accompanied the influx of new immigrants indicated that 
civilization could no longer be a function of American identity, but 
rather American process. Since the frontier provided the 
mechanism of Americanization, it followed that only participants 
in that experience could identify themselves as “the distinctive and 
intensely American stock.” This distinguished the frontier persona
those are fit to live who do not fear to die and none are fit to die who have 
shrunk from the joy o f life and the duty of life.” Donna Haraway, “Teddy Bear 
Patriarchy: Taxidermy in the Garden of Eden, New York City, 1908-1936,” in 
Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World o f  M odern Science, 
(New York: Routledge, 1989), 26-58.
24 Theodore Roosevelt, The Wilderness Hunter. Works, II, (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1926): 7-13.
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from its more passive counterpart, the eastern agrarian. 
Roosevelt’s equation thus laid the groundwork for class division 
on the basis of western enterprise versus eastern subordination.25
In this sense, Roosevelt’s construction of civilization 
mirrors Annette Kolodny’s gendered interpretation of both 
psychological and cultural development by which the ambivalent 
child (or civilization) seeks to differentiate itself from the mother. 
She asserts:
[the child] repeat[s] a movement back into the realm of the Mother, 
in order to begin again, and then an attempted (and not always 
successful) movement out of that containment in order to 
experience the self as independent, assertive, and sexually active. 
Where the maternal embrace is not so overwhelming as to thwart 
that movement the [child] either erupts with an expression of 
violence -as the seductive embrace is rejected- or with guilt, as 
[he] begins to perceive what has resulted from the single-minded 
cultivation and mastery of the virgin continent.26
For Roosevelt civilization in America required the frontier’s
essential themes of “regeneration through regression, isolation, and
savage war.” Moreover, the spoils of this civilizing process fell
disproportionately to those who rejected society’s maternal
embrace through active aggression.
No cultural medium exemplified Roosevelt’s civilization 
project and its response to frontier anxiety quite like the genre of 
the Western, which emerged with renewed vigor at the turn-of-the-
25 Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning o f  the West, 4 vols. (New York: G. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1889-1896): III, 96-7; Slotkin, Gunfighter, 49-50.
26 Kolodny, The Lay o f  the Land, 153.
27 Slotkin, Gunfighter, 44.
15
century. Precursors to the Western existed in the stories of Janies 
Fenimore Cooper, Washington Irving, Francis Parkman, and a host 
of other literary talents. But intervening changes in the eastern 
perception of the West’s civilizing function -due largely to 
Roosevelt’s efforts- gave fresh import to the tum-of-the-century 
Western.28 Likewise, it reflects the growing challenges facing 
turn-of-the-century men and the manifestation of these challenges 
in the masculine attributes of the genre. Because Owen Wister 
maintained extensive personal and ideological dialogue with 
Roosevelt and, likewise, because his novel, The Virginian, is 
widely-recognized as setting a new course for the Western, his 
contribution provides a fitting characterization of the genre as a 
whole. The work features a persistent rejection of society’s 
encroachment upon male agency, a trademark thereafter ensconced 
in the Western pantheon.
The inspiration for the novel hails from dilemmas in the 
author’s life.
Owen Wister was, for all practical purposes, an eastern dude. The 
child of a troubled marriage, he spent much of his life appeasing 
the “fierce energy” of his mother and the vocational prescriptions
28 For a more thorough discussion of the Eastern Establishment’s changing view  
of the western frontier and the altered literary expressions that accompanied it, 
consult G. Edward White, The Eastern Establishment and the Western 
Experience: The West o f  Frederic Remington, Theodore Roosevelt, and Owen 
Wister, (Austin: University o f Texas Press, 1989): 31-50.
29 Jane Tompkins, West o f  Everything: The Inner Life o f  Westerns, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992): 131.
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of his father, which led him to abandon his first love, music.30 
After a brief foray into business, in 1885 Wister defied his father 
by moving west to undertake a career in writing. Soon after, he set 
his literary talents to vanquishing his remaining ghost, the stifling 
dictates of his mother.31 Wister’s resistance to his mother was 
evident in his equation of her with all the West was not - “society, 
art, manners, taste, inherited wealth, good breeding, [and] a life of 
leisure in exquisite surroundings.” These traits coincided perfectly 
with the excesses Wister, like his protagonist, needed to shed in 
becoming the consummate westerner.32
The narrative of The Virginian extends Wister’s issues with 
his mother to society as a whole. The Virginian’s wife, Molly, 
provides the trope for his dismissal of the East’s overly feminine 
character. Molly represents genteel class snobbery manifest in an 
ideology of “egalitarianism” that connotes for Wister the 
“emasculated and intellectually exhausted American upper class.” 
The Virginian’s courtship of Molly is thus played out as an 
ideological contest between the “quality” and “equality” elements 
of the American character, a la Roosevelt’s enterprising and
30 Darwin Payne, Owen Wister: Chronicler o f  the West, Gentleman o f  the East 
(Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1985): 16, 58-9, 109-11.
31 ibid., 59.
32 Tompkins, West o f  Everything, 143.
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subordinate classes.33 The essence of this social order emerges in 
the Virginian’s commentary:
It was through the Declaration of Independence that we 
acknowledged the eternal inequality of man. For by it we 
abolished a cut-and-dried aristocracy. We had seen little men 
artificially held up in high places, and great men artificially held 
down in low places, and our own justice-loving hearts abhorred 
this violence to human nature. Therefore, we decreed that every 
man should thenceforth have equal liberty to find his own level. 
By this very decree we acknowledged and gave freedom to true 
aristocracy, saying “Let the best man win, whoever he is.” Let the 
best man win! That is America’s word. That is true democracy. 
And true democracy and true aristocracy are one and the same 
thing. I f  anybody cannot see this,'-so much the worse for his 
eyesight.34
With a glaring lack of subtlety, Molly becomes the equality of the 
old aristocracy in Wister’s class equation.
The triumph of Wister’s quality over equality is 
consummated when the Virginian prevails over Molly in an 
extended courtship that pits the one against the other. The climax 
of this struggle emerges late in the novel when the hero asserts , 
independence from the high-minded ideals o f the heroine by 
defying her ultimatum that he desist from a duel with the villain 
Trampas, or lose her as a result. The Virginian, however, shirks 
this call to female sensibility and Molly’s boldness undermines her 
egalitarian agenda as Trampas falls and the Virginian remains, “by 
love and [Molly’s] surrender to him .. .more than ever she could be,
33 Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, 175-79.
34 Owen Wister, The Virginian: A  Horseman o f  the Plains, Edited by Philip 
Durham. (Boston: HoughtonMiflin Company, 1968): 93.
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with all that she had.”35 This inversion of the societal code, 
featuring a male persona in active defiance of feminine 
sensibilities, became a defining trait of the Western genre, a 
cultural medium that persisted throughout the twentieth century in 
fortifying the masculine ideal of American manhood.36
Frontier anxiety in the late nineteenth century arose from a 
dwindling public domain and the attendant perception that 
America could no longer Americanize its own, particularly the 
growing tide of ill-perceived immigrants. The transitory climate 
that resulted allowed men like Teddy Roosevelt to alter the 
discourse of civilization to accommodate a new class of 
individuals who, by aggression, asserted themselves atop a revised 
social hierarchy. Although Roosevelt implied male agency in this 
new formula, the Western made this point explicit. For his part, 
Wister solidified the Western as a potent cultural medium by 
reinforcing male agressiveness. Consequently, women in
c
Westerns became symbols of eastern excess with limited relevance 
to the demands of the West, and hence, civilization in general. 
Thus for men as a whole, the closing of the frontier set off a chain 
of developments that helped undermine the manly ideal of mid­
35 ibid., 272.
36 For a thorough and compelling discussion of the core attributes of the Western 
genre and how it functioned as a male response to social change, see Tompkins, 
West o f  Everything.
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nineteenth century manhood. Masculinity emerged, in part, to help 
fill this void.
An Altered Political Framework
Having discussed frontier anxiety and its transforming 
effect upon American manhood, I will now highlight the effect of 
the changing political framework of the late-nineteenth century1 in 
reinforcing the same. The rise of democratic conservatism 
throughout the latter-half of the nineteenth century spurred this 
political transformation. It began as a seed, long resting in the 
American soil, that germinated in the theories and legal doctrines 
of William Graham Sumner and Justice Stephen Field, 
respectively, before blooming alongside America’s growing 
embrace of industrial capitalism. By the turn of the century, 
industrial capitalism’s insistence upon property rights had 
undermined the Jeffersonian tradition’s embrace of individual 
honor.37 As such, the shift afforded workers, and hence men, 
fewer options in maintaining the manly ideal and its emphasis 
upon individual self-worth. The aggressive response of American 
men, evident in outbreaks like the Homestead Strike, reflected the
37 Put simply, the Jeffersonian tradition’s preference for individual honor is most 
evident in the founder’s language of the Declaration of Independence: “all men 
are created equal, with certain unalienable rights... among th[em] are life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” This profound statement of American 
egalitarianism served to bolster the standing of the average American man for 
over a century before coming under attack in the mid-nineteenth century by 
democratic conservatives’ overarching concern for property rights.
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growing appeal o f a more masculine concept of American 
manhood.
In April of 1897, over a decade after Ulysses S. Grant, the storied 
Civil War veteran and former President, died, a host of fellow 
veterans and citizens gathered in New York for the formal 
dedication of his tomb. The scandal of souvenir dealing that 
accompanied the event provided a fitting paradox of both Grant 
and the age in general -his selfless service to country on the one 
hand, and his political corruption on the other.38 The disgrace 
prompted the Civil War generation to wonder if its successors 
cared more about moneymaking than the virtue of their
3 9predecessors. They implored Americans to follow the example 
of veterans who had forsaken “private ambition, selfishness, and 
greed of gain” for public service.40 The call went unheralded, 
however, as citizens not only failed to follow suit, but enacted 
subsequent reforms that deemed pensions for un-needy veterans an 
unreasonable burden for taxpayers.41
The rebuff was telling. The mid-nineteenth century’s 
unpredictable economy demanded a strong character rooted in self-
38 Hoganson, American Manhood, 28.
39 Charles Reagan Wilson, Baptized in Blood: The Religion o f  the Lost Cause 
1865-1920, (Athens: University o f Georgia Press, 1980): 8.
40 James A. Tawney, Memorial Day speech, 1895, as quoted in Hoganson, 
American Manhood, 28.
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restraint as a prerequisite for men to make their living. Men were 
granted or refused credit based on assessments of their character. 
Credit raters like Dim and Bradstreet evaluated prospective 
borrowers on their track records of keeping their word and 
providing for their families.42 This emphasis upon self-restraint 
encouraged young men to work hard and live frugally in order to 
amass sufficient capital for a small business capable of supporting 
a family in moderate comfort.43 In short, mid nineteenth-century 
America espoused an ideal of manliness rooted in individual 
honor.
By the 1890s, however, manly virtue was no longer 
synonymous with male identity. The manly ideal had evolved in a 
crucible of small-scale capitalism, fast receding by the 1890s. In 
the “corporatized and bureaucratized” society that accompanied 
the rise of industrial capitalism, manly self-restraint brought 
diminishing returns. Amidst this transformation the prospect of' 
individual enterprise for the American male took a hit. The sudden 
explosion of entry-level work throughout the economy meant that
41 Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins o f  
Social Policy in the United States, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1992): 2.
42 Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, Family Fortunes: Men and Women o f  
the English M iddle Class, 1780-1850 (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 
1987): 207-8. Although Family Fortunes charts English middle-class fomiation, 
its observations, particularly those regarding the significance of manliness in 
class identification, are relevant to class formation in the United States; Mary P. 
Ryan, Cradle o f  the Middle Class: The Family in Oneida County, New York, 
1790-1865, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981): 140-42.
43 ibid., 165-85.
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men entering the workforce could expect fewer promotions to 
responsible, more lucrative management positions.44 As such, 
manly self-denial and -discipline became less profitable. The old 
ideal echoed its imperatives of hard work and independence, but to 
limited avail, as manly restraint yielded to masculine aggression in 
the resulting frustration of American males. For the most part, 
Americans viewed the 1890s as a dreadful transition from “a 
simple self-contained, predominantly agrarian society to a more 
complex, increasingly urban, and industrial one.”45 The gravity of 
this shift, then, required the reformulation of basic democratic 
principles to prove justifiable.
Beginning in 1872, with his ascendance to a Chair of 
Political and Social Science at Yale, William Graham Sumner set 
to re-working basic assumptions about democracy in a manner 
conducive to industrial capitalism. Sumner’s project drew upon 
ideas already fixed in American consciousness by noteworthy 
theorists like Locke, Darwin, and Spencer. But his genius lay in 
resolving inconsistencies at a high point of American anxiety by 
imparting an invigorating gloss to existing thought. For Sumner, 
rights, liberty, and equality, provided the touchstones in this 
reformulation of American democracy. Consistent with his
44 Stuart M.Blumin, The Emergence o f  the Middle Class: Social Experience in 
the American City, 1760-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989): 
290-5; Peter G. Filene, Him/Her/Self: Sex Roles in Modern America, (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986): 70-3.
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conservative objectives, they assumed meanings in contrast to their 
erstwhile counterparts under the Jeffersonian tradition. 
Accordingly, they formed a sturdy ledge for resting property 
rights, the shibboleth of the Gilded Age.
For Sumner, the idea that rights were a part of man’s 
natural heritage, as promulgated by natural rights philosophers, 
was an “exploded superstition.” In his opinion, the ideal primitive 
condition never even existed.46 Rights could not be held in nature, 
Sumner contended, because nature offered nothing save the 
opportunity for extracting a living insofar as the individual was 
capable. Bereft of their natural foundation, rights became social 
constructs, or, “rules of the game” subject to given circumstances. 
47 They were contingent upon the individual and far from absolute, 
derived from common sense and the applied wisdom of “actual 
life” experience.48 Thus for Sumner rights were defensible not as 
moral entitlements, but as societal endorsements of material 
acquisition.
Liberty likewise lacked moral validity for Sumner. The 
notion of primitive man’s freedom was a fiction, he believed, 
because nature was more accurately a state of slavery. Lacking the
45 H.A. Pierce, “A Review of Finance and Business,” B anker’s Magazine 
(February 1894): 563-67, as cited in Wrobel, American Exceptionalism, 53.
46 William Graham Sumner, Earth-Hunger and Other Essays (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1913): 131.
47 ibid., 83.
48 William Graham Sumner, Folkways (Boston: The Athenaeum Press, 1906):
29.
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technology to ease the requirements of subsistence, the savage’s 
life was consumed in struggle.49 Absolute liberty in doing what 
one pleased was thus impossible because nature demanded that all 
privileges be offset by the acceptance of inexorable restraints upon 
the individual. Therefore liberty “in the highest and best sense,” 
applied only to individual work and achievement. Hence liberty, 
like rights, extended only as far as society’s defense of capital 
accumulation.50
Finally, with regard to equality, Sumner was still more 
skeptical of the liberal democratic tradition’s dependence upon 
natural rights. He echoed Roosevelt and Wister in asserting that 
universal equality was “the purest falsehood., .ever put into human 
language.”51 Because all differ in tastes, talents, and powers, even 
“pure equality before the law [was] impossible.” For Sumner, 
creating the illusion of equality in either status or material 
possessions constituted a disruption of societal advance, thereby 
undermining the foundation upon which society stood.52 The 
similarities between Sumner and Wister -as far as natural rights 
are concerned—are evident in the latter’s aforementioned disdain 
for the “violence to human nature” resulting from “little men”
49 Sumner, Earth-Hunger, 139,
50 ibid., 149-50.
51 ibid, 88
52 William Graham Sumner, The Challenge o f  Facts and Other Essays, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1914): 44.
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being “artificially held up in high places” while “great men” are 
relegated to “low places” under the liberal democratic formula.53
Without much imagination, one sees how Sumner’s
formulation of democracy formed a wholesale indictment of the
liberal democratic tradition and its notion of rights rooted in a state
of nature. As Robert Green McCIoskey elaborates:
The Jeffersonian theory of democracy was based upon spiritual 
and humane, rather than material and economic, 
values... [Jefferson’s] chief interests, in short, were the ‘rights’ of 
the individual to realize his moral personality, and not the rights to 
buy, sell, and prosper economically...When he used the term 
“liberty,” the early democrat meant, first of all, freedom of 
conscience -moral liberty- rather than freedom of business 
enterprise... [Finally,] when the revolutionary democrat spoke of 
equality, he was concerned primarily with an essential equality of 
men before God, a sharing by all in the same basic humanness. 4
In this sense, Sumner’s gloss of rights, liberty, and equality
t
represented a new interpretation of democracy’s core values that 
effectively “materializ[ed]... community value standards” within 
the liberal democratic tradition.55 In all respects, Sumner’s 
formulae favored industrial capitalism and its implicit reliance 
upon private property.56 His shrewd logic wrought cracks in the 
political foundation whereby individual worth fell subject to 
material acquisition. The transformation helped grease a slippery 
slope that promoted men’s slide from a tradition of honor wherein
53 Wister, The Virginian, 93.
54 Robert Green McCIoskey, American Conservatism in the Age o f  Enterprise 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951): 2-3.
ibid., 20.
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they held greater control over the terms of their labor, and hence 
lives, in falling subject to a more conservative framework that 
emphasized property rights.
But the mere articulation of conservative ideals was not 
enough to transform the political framework of late-nineteenth 
century America. Although Sumner’s logic found currency among 
a growing segment of the populace, in order to prevail, it required 
acceptance by the political structure it sought to revise. At the 
time Sumner began his post at Yale, both the Constitution and 
Supreme Court’s resistance to democratic conservatism were 
stolid. But their resistance was short- lived as the high court soon 
yielded to interpretations more consistent with Sumner’s ideas. 
Accordingly, the public interest, once secure under the liberal 
democratic tradition, fell increasingly subject to individual 
property rights. The career of Justice Stephen J. Field provides a 
compelling link in this evolution of American conservatism.
Nineteenth century conservatives believed the judiciary, 
not the popularly elected branches of federal government, should 
arbitrate the claims of conflicting groups in balancing the “rights of 
individuals, the sanctity of private property, and the welfare of the
57community.” Supreme Court Justice Field seized upon this ethos 
and invoked Sumner’s materialist values in writing legal opinions
56 Edwin Mims, The M ajority o f  the People (New York: Modem Age Books, 
1941): 213-221.
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that, over time, elevated the entrepreneur at the expense of 
majority rule. He began as a dissenting minority, but through 
persistence and the growing pro-capitalist sentiments of the Gilded 
Age, prevailed in yoking his conservative bias to the Court’s
58defining authority of judicial review.
Field’s accomplishment originated in his dissenting opinion 
in the Slaughter-House Cases of 1873, In 1869 the Louisiana 
legislature passed a law incorporating the Crescent City Live-Stock 
Landing and Slaughterhouse Company. This law required that all 
butchering of animals in New Orleans be conducted at the facilities 
of the Crescent City Company to allow state officials to better 
regulate the health and safety of the community. Local butchers 
brought suit as the laws resulted in higher slaughter fees. The 
issue before the Court was whether the state law violated the 
property rights of local butchers under the privileges and 
immunities clause of the 14th Amendment, which asserts that “no 
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.” In a 5 to 
4 decision, the Court upheld the Louisiana law.
Justice Samuel F. Miller, arguing for the majority, 
interpreted the privileges and immunities clause narrowly in stating 
that it pertained to select rights of national citizenship -property
57 Chambers II, Tyranny o f  Change, 41.
28
not among them- that states could not abridge. Furthermore, 
Miller argued that the purpose of the 14th Amendment (enacted 
after the Civil War) was to protect the rights of African Americans 
and not expand the rights of whites. Field dissented, arguing that 
property rights were in fact among the privileges and immunities 
protected from state interference by the 14th Amendment. Three 
colleagues joined Field in contending that the Louisiana law 
violated the amendment by depriving butchers of property without 
due process of the law. Moreover, all the dissenting justices 
rejected the Court’s argument that the amendment was designed to 
protect only the rights of black Americans.59
The importance of the Court’s interpretation of the 
privileges and immunities clause in the Slaughterhouse Cases can 
not be underestimated. From the standpoint of manliness and 
masculinity, the matter held special significance. The real question 
was whether, the federal government should protect the general 
interest in public health or a company’s specific interest in 
unrestrained property rights. If the former, then men could retain a 
political framework compatible with manliness. The manly ideal, 
rooted as it was in self-restraint and strength of character, required 
a political culture capable of reinforcing these attributes; the public
58 Robert Green McCIoskey, American Conservatism in the Age o f  Enterprise 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951): 72-7.
59 W est’s Encyclopedia o f  American Law, vol.. 9, (St. Paul: West Group, 1998): 
273; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wallace 36 (1873).
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good was an important expression of this ability. By contrast, if 
government proved incapable of safeguarding the public good, 
men might take this responsibility upon themselves. This would 
require foregoing manliness in favor of masculinity in defending 
more forcibly their interests against the property interests of the 
few. In this sense, the tenuous majority in the Slaughterhouse 
decision placed the manly ideal in a precarious position.
Although Field’s dissent, by definition, implied a set-back 
to his conservative cause, subsequent decisions revealed the 
opposite, placing the manly ideal in further jeopardy. Munn v. 
Illinois (1877) brought the issue of property rights before the Court 
once again as the first in a series known as the Granger Cases. 
These suits dealt with issues resulting from the rapid growth of 
manufacturing and transportation interests following the Civil War. 
A number of these companies featured railroad concerns and 
operators of sizeable grain warehouses who abused their near 
absolute control over hauling and storage by charging exorbitant 
prices to farmers. To counter this leverage, farmers developed a 
politically powerful cooperative, or Grange. The group 
successfully lobbied state legislatures in the Midwest to pass laws 
regulating prices, railroads, warehouses, and public utilities, all 
tied to the transport and storage of grain.
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The railroads and grain warehouses brought suit in the 
courts, claiming the state regulations were unconstitutional. They 
rested their complaint on the laws’ abridgement of Congress’s 
right to regulate interstate commerce, their violation of the 
Constitution’s prohibition against interfering with contracts, and 
their violation of the 14th Amendment in depriving businesses of 
their liberty and property without due process. The Munn case 
thus posed a clear and important question for a nation with rapidly 
developing industries: Did the Constitution permit a state to
regulate privately owned businesses?60
Justice Waite, again writing for the majority, ruled in favor 
of the states by upholding the Granger laws. But rather than rest 
his decision on the valid grounds that no constitutional question 
had been raised, he held instead that the businesses in question 
were subject to regulation because their operations “affected 
[them] with a public interest.” Justice Field again dissented, 
arguing as he had in the Slaughterhouse Cases against the 
majority’s invasion of private property rights, which he said were 
protected against state power by the due process clause of the 14th 
Amendment. The assertion reinforced his belief that “state police 
power” could not be used to regulate private businesses.61
60 Thomas T. Lewis and Richard L. Wilson, ed., Encyclopedia o f  the U.S. 
Supreme Court, vol. II, (Pasadena: Salem Press, 2001): 631-2.
61McCloskey, American Conservatism, 79; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
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Munn v. Illinois represented another slight to Field’s 
conservative project, but with an important exception. Unlike four 
years earlier, the majority was now willing to accept that the 
Constitution should acknowledge some limitations upon the states’ 
regulation of private property. The recklessness. of a contrary 
interpretation was accepted, “and the basic premise that the 
property right is ultimate” was now “fuzzily” embraced.62 Proof of 
this development emerged a decade later when, in the unanimous 
decision, Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., the 
federal courts granted corporations standing as “persons” under the 
14th Amendment. In a tribute to his persistence and the nation’s 
growing embrace of capitalism, Field’s earlier dissents hit pay-dirt 
as Sumnerian conservatism at last permeated the American 
Constitutional tradition.
The Santa Clara decision resulted from the state of 
California’s attempts to collect taxes owed by the Southern Pacific 
and Central Pacific railroads. Advocates for the railroad 
companies claimed, as had the petitioners in Munn, that the due 
process clause of the 14th Amendment made the state tax against 
them unconstitutional for depriving them of property without due 
process. The question before the Court was whether a 
corporation’s rights were defensible in the same way as a person’s.
62 McCIoskey, American Conservatism , 79-80.
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The Court did not directly address the 14th Amendment 
issue in its opinion. Signaling a major shift in the Court’s thinking, 
Chief Justice Waite asserted even before hearing oral arguments
ththat the jurists would not deal with the question of whether 14 
Amendment equal protection applied to corporations. They were 
already “of the opinion that it d[id].” Having thus established that 
corporations would henceforth enjoy legal standing as “persons,” 
the Court proceeded on the narrow issue of whether the state of 
California could tax fences on the railroad companies’ property. 
The jurists decided unanimously against the state, ruling that its tax 
laws constituted a violation of corporate rights under due process. 
Hence the Santa Clara decision amounted to a de facto validation 
of Field’s conservative logic. By using the due process guarantees 
of the 14th Amendment, the resulting opinion confirmed that 
corporation lawyers were now able to protect businesses from 
numerous state regulations put forward on behalf of the public 
good.63
In many respects, the conservative project of William 
Graham Sumner and Justice Stephen J. Field mirrored the 
civilization discourse of Teddy Roosevelt and Owen Wister; both 
elevated private enterprise above universal equality. But there were 
critical differences. Whereas Roosevelt and Wister drew upon the
53 W est’s Encyclopedia o f  American Law, 118-9; Santa Clara Co. v. Southern 
Pacific Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
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unique and demanding environment of the frontier as the agent in 
distinguishing society’s ‘quality’ from its ‘equality,’ Sumner and 
Field suggested a new ‘frontier’ of industrial capitalism in 
effectively doing the same, with private property the gauge of 
individual enterprise. Proving one’s masculinity by meeting the 
requirements of the rugged West was adapted to the industrial East 
in a transformation that protected private property rights and —by 
implication— the subordination of labor in validating a privileged 
entrepreneurial class. “The health o f [this] new corporate order 
required the willing subordination of worker to manager,” and of 
public interest to “corporate necessity.”64 In this sense, 
civilization’s traditional emphasis of restraint fell, increasingly, to 
a Rooseveltian discourse emphasizing the vigor, in this case, of 
eastern entrepreneurs. Thus in a new political framework where 
workers lost autonomy to close supervision, they struggled to 
preserve a sense of personal significance.65 Masculine expressions 
emerged on both sides of the material divide as the enterprising
64 Slotkin, Gunfighter, 19.
65 Chambers, Tyranny, 34-5. Although his ideas were not popularized 'until his 
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further depriving the worker of honor within his profession. David 
Montgomery, The Fall o f  the House o f  Labor: The Workplace, the State, and 
American Labor, (Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of  
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65 William Serrin, Homestead: The Glory and Tragedy o f  an American Steel 
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and subordinate classes clashed in defense of their interests within 
an altered political climate.
The Homestead Strike of 1892 helps illustrate the 
displacement of manliness by masculinity in the working class of 
the late-nineteenth century. It demonstrates not only the
difficulties workers faced in setting the terms of their labor, but 
also the aggressiveness that followed. In June the Carnegie Steel 
Company, the world’s largest steel manufacturer, refused to renew 
the union contract governing its central plant in Homestead, 
Pennsylvania. After members of the Amalgamated Association of 
Iron and Steel Workers, representing the plant’s skilled workers, 
refused to dissolve their union, the company locked out the entire 
3,800-man work force.66 On July 5 it imported 300 Pinkerton 
guards to enforce its plan to commence operations with nonunion 
labor.
In the wee hours of the following morning, worker lookouts 
spotted barges carrying guards up the Monongahela River, 
prompting a militant reaction that captured national attention. 
When the Pinkertons landed in hopes of securing the plant so it 
could be operated by replacements, shooting broke out on both 
sides and casualties quickly mounted.67 The unionists had a better 
strategic position and, firing from behind makeshift fortifications
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on higher ground, they effectively trapped the guards. Workers 
bombarded the Pinkertons with cannons, a flaming railroad car, 
and volleys of dynamite and fireworks. Their relentlessness paid 
off as soon after the Pinkertons surrendered amid promises they 
would not be harmed. But despite the best efforts of union leaders 
to ensure their safety, the guards ran a gauntlet of infuriated 
workers and townspeople who insulted, beat, and humiliated them 
as they proceeded out of town.68
In spite of their spirited battle the Homestead workers lost 
the war. Horrified by the unrest, Pennsylvania Governor Robert 
Pattison ordered the state militia to occupy the town, which it ruled 
through October in cooperation with Carnegie Steel.69 By the time 
the troops left, the mill had resumed production with non-union 
labor, forcing the workers to end the strike.70 Though a dramatic 
showing, the feeble position of unionists was evident in the profits 
the company gathered despite the tumult. For that year, the 
company netted $4 million and, by 1899, having weathered the 
storm of union resistance, Carnegie Steel was averaging a cool $30 
million. James H. Bridge, a Carnegie scholar, surmised the strike’s 
significance in terms friendly to industry. No longer would “the 
method of apportioning the work, of regulating the turns, of
67 Paul Krause, The Battle fo r  Homestead 1880-1892: Politics, Culture, and  
Steel, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992): 15-20.
68 ibid., 34-6.
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altering the machinery, in short, every detail of working the great 
plant...[be] subject to the interference of some busy body 
representing the Amalgamated Association.”71 The end result of 
the Homestead Strike, like its many counterparts around the turn of 
the century, signified a turn toward what many workers and 
citizens viewed as a new form of slavery. The shift marked a new 
political framework characterized by laborers’ economic and social 
subservience to industrial capitalism.
Events like Homestead, although political in nature, had a 
profound impact upon the male psyche. Senator John Palmer, an 
Illinois Democrat, put it well in responding to the spectacle: 
“Within my lifetime, I have seen marvelous changes. There was a 
time when individualism was the universal rule and men lived 
alone...because they could support themselves; but matters have 
changed.” Events like the Homestead Strike effectively broke 
mens’ spirit, and revealed employers’ growing ability to “manage 
their business to suit themselves.” As a result, the majority of men 
were left to conclude that “the conditions of life [were] determined 
by forces too large for them to battle.”72 Men still fought, but they
70 ibid., 90.
71 Figures listed are actual, not modem equivalents. James H. Bridge, The Inside 
History o f  the Carnegie Steel Company: A  Romance o f  Millions, (New York: 
Amo Press, 1903): 296-315, 202.
72 Sen. John Palmer, Congressional Record, 52, pt.6, 5824-25; Margaret F. 
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resisted more out of frustration than a belief that their resistance 
was of meaningful consequence.
Aggressive responses to industrial capitalism, however, 
were not limited to the working class. Men of the middle- and 
upper-classes experienced their own set of tensions in confronting 
the altered political framework of turn-of-the-century America, 
namely, a fear of working-class unrest. To counter signs of 
growing restlessness on the part of laborers, the bourgeoisie sought 
more subtle means of harnessing aggression to preserve their 
advantage within society. The resulting emphasis upon force and 
strenuousness fed a growing interest in organized youth sports like
73boxing, baseball, and football.
Aside from instilling vigor in boys and young men, 
competitive sports also helped reinforce bourgeois values of 
discipline and productivity. When boys began competitive sports -  
regardless of their class- they entered into an organized institution 
that served as a metaphor for American “success.” Sports instilled 
an appreciation for teamwork and individual excellence, skill 
positions and grunts, comebacks and routs, and, most importantly, 
winning and losing. Regardless of the sport, only a minority 
would excel and far fewer would reach the exclusive rank of 
professional. Nonetheless, just by playing, the participant learned
73 Jackson Lears, No Place o f  Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation o f  
American Culture, 1880-2000, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981): 107-8.
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the virtues of both competition and subordination within a 
hierarchical structure such as that espoused by capitalism. 
Competitive sports provided an object lesson in the importance of 
trying hard and -when your best is not enough- accepting defeat 
gracefully.74 Organized sports thus became for the bourgeoisie, 
among other things, a means of social conditioning whereby 
American males came to terms with, and accepted, their position in 
society. For privileged males, then, it remained simply to justify 
their lofty status by defeating their less skilled rivals in the socially 
sanctioned media of the ring, the diamond, and the field.
The final decades of the nineteenth century witnessed 
profound change in the political structure of America. The 
transformation began with the reformulation of democratic 
principles by shrewd minds like William Graham Sumner that 
found acceptance in the American legal tradition through persistent 
efforts by men like Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field. Through 
these challenges to the Jeffersonian tradition of American 
democracy, a new conservatism emerged to justify industrial 
capitalism’s demand for property rights at the expense of 
individual honor and the public good. With the courts’ 
endorsement, a new political framework established itself, evident 
in men’s loss of identity to industrial capitalism. Bereft of a
14 R. W. Connell, Masculinities, (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1995): 35-6,
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climate conducive to individual honor, increasingly, working class 
men embraced aggression in demonstrating their frustration with 
the revised political order. Despite their aggressive tenor, events 
like the Homestead Strike were destined to fail. In the process of 
failing, however, the working class challenged upper- and middle- 
class men to identify alternatives such as organized sports, in part, 
to channel the competitiveness of industrial capitalism toward 
more socially” acceptable ends. In short, the altered political 
framework of late-nineteenth century America produced a 
pervasive self-consciousness in men that effectively transformed 
the calm confidence of mid-nineteenth century manliness to a more 
frantic masculinity forged by conformity to unwelcome 
expectations.
Female Assertion and Male Resistance
Men in the late-nineteenth century experienced a growing 
loss of control evident in a post-frontier anxiety and a changing 
political framework that undermined the erstwhile construction of 
manliness. They responded through aggression, but their behavior 
stemmed from an abiding insecurity that left them vulnerable, even 
paranoid, in the wake of this transformation. I will now focus on 
how women emerged at this time to further damage —albeit 
unknowingly— the fragile ego of the American male. In making
40
this point, I will likewise address how men resisted these assertions 
through a more steadfast embrace of the masculine ideal.
Women in the final decade of the nineteenth century 
lamented many of the same changes as men. Accordingly, they 
devoted much of their efforts to reconciling modernism with 
tradition.75 As men appeared to abandon manliness to 
accommodate changes brought about by industrial capitalism, 
women sought to revive its essential traits by advocating “a genteel 
style of politics based on intelligence, morality, and self- 
restraint.”76 In doing so, they helped unite much of what 
democratic conservatism had divided; men of all classes rallied 
under a common banner of masculinity. They demonstrated this 
consensus, among other ways, by adopting new terms for deficient 
masculinity like “sissy,” “pussy-foot,” and “stuffed shirt,” to 
deplore women’s growing influence while reinforcing more
masculine standards o f behavior.77 For men to lose their honor
*
75 Chambers, Tyranny, xxii.
76 Hoganson, American Manhood, 15. Clearly, not all women joined in filling 
the void created by men’s abdication of the manly ideal. However, the 
emergence of the “New Woman” as a fresh presence in U.S. politics and society 
at the tum-of-the-century provides a meaningful stereotype that offers further 
evidence o f men’s changing perception of women. For a more thorough 
discussion of the New Woman and her “threat to men’s power and security,” see 
Amaldo Testi, “The Gender of Reform Politics,” The Journal o f  American  
History, vol. 81, (March 1995): 1520-4; The impetus of the growing women’s 
movement derived from attempts by women to “improve [their] status and 
usefulness to society” by increasing their role in directing their public and 
private destinies. Chambers, Tyranny o f  Change, 1.
77 JohnHigham, Writing American History, (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1970); 79-102.
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was one thing, but to have it restored by women was simply 
unacceptable.
The growing assertiveness of women is evident in Charlotte 
Perkins Gilman’s attempt to alter the discourse of civilization by 
according women a greater role in civilization’s advance. 
Prevailing wisdom rested civilization’s perfection on “elaborate 
and excessive” differences between the sexes whereby 
breadwinning husbands provided for their needy spouses. Gilman 
viewed this as an inefficient arrangement. Accordingly, she 
proffered challenges to conventional gender roles by highlighting 
the “evolutionary cost” of women’s dependence upon men.
Like other advocates of civilized progress, Gilman viewed
human evolution as a teleological process. Since perfection was
the all-important end, it was critical that civilized society do
everything in its power to achieve it. Gilman believed that the
human objective was “progress [and] development” :
...we are here, not merely to live, but to grow- not to be content 
with lean savagery or fat barbarism or sordid semi-civilization, but 
to toil on through the centuries, and build up the ever nobler forms 
of life toward which social evolution tends. 8
For Gilman, denying women an active role in this project was to 
answer the challenge with one of civilization’s arms tied behind its 
back.
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In particular, Gilman challenged the notion of sexual 
distinction as the principal mark of a civilized society. She looked 
to secondary sex characteristics in nature -physical features like 
“mane[s], comb[s], wattles, spurs, gorgeous color [and] superior 
size”- to make her point. Admitting that the presence of these 
traits allowed individual organisms to reproduce more readily than 
others, Gilman sought to show how, conversely, their excess would 
ultimately undermine the self-preservation of organisms as a 
whole. For example, a peacock could tolerate a tail only so large 
before that distinguishing feature became an impediment to its 
primary goal of survival. In short, sexual distinction required a 
degree of moderation to be truly advantageous. Having thus 
borrowed from nature, Gilman brought her argument to the 
discourse of the day by highlighting the limits of civilized society’s 
obsession with sex-distinction. For Gilman, women in society, like 
the over-plumed peacock in nature, were impaired by their sexual
79excess.
Aside from Gilman’s divergence on the gender issue, her 
project was not that distinguishable from Roosevelt’s and its 
emphasis on millennialism and race. She differed only in rejecting 
Roosevelt’s call for sexual distinction in advancing civilization.
78 Charlotte Perkins Stetson [Gilman], Women and Economics: A  Study o f  the 
Economic Relation between Men and Women as a Factor in Social Evolution 
(Boston: Small, Maynard, 1898): 207.
79 ibid., 30-4.
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For Gilman, the oversexed, civilized woman - “feeble and
clumsy”- embodied the devolutionary effect of women’s, and
80hence civilization’s, unsung potential. She believed the more 
energy a culture devoted to sexual differentiation, the less there 
remained for the more important cultural task of distinguishing the 
“races.”81 Gilman argued that only civilized races could afford the 
excess of female indolence; however, by allowing it to persist, 
“civilized races” risked their advantage by failing to harness their 
full potential.
Not surprisingly, Gilman’s contribution to the civilization 
discourse posed problems for men in maintaining their exclusive 
role within it. Her call for a higher female purpose held a 
compelling logic that threatened men’s standing at the high point 
of male self-consciousness. Therefore, Gilman’s project 
demanded a sound rebuttal to preserve men’s standing in the 
prevailing discourse. G. Stanley Hall, a prominent social theorist, 
provided this timely response. And where Gilman viewed the 
primary threat to civilization as an excessive femininity among 
women, Hall countered by attributing the problem to a lack of 
virility among men.
Hall was a professor of pedagogy and psychology who 
devoted his life to the study of human development. He believed
80 ibid., 46.
81 Gilman, Women and Economics, 31-9, 58-9.
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in the inexorable advance of civilization under the stewardship of 
white males, but feared middle-class men’s deficient “toughness 
and strength” in realizing it.82 The final decade of the nineteenth 
century witnessed a rise in upper- and middle-class women’s 
influence. This emergence placed a growing number of women in
the public eye as volunteers and advocates for expanded suffrage,
0-1
temperance, and the poor. Women’s gains appeared to come at 
the expense of men; this alone magnified Hall’s accomplishment. 
For just as women seemed to corral what had been an elusive 
civilization discourse, Hall opened a new gate by arguing that 
civilization itself was to blame for men’s declining influence.
Hall popularized neurasthenics and recapitulation theory in 
calling for men’s return to the primitive virtues of their ancestors. 
As stated, men of the late- nineteenth century confronted an uneasy 
intersection between manliness and masculinity. As middle-class 
ideologies of honor and restraint became less appealing, the manly 
ideal foundered. Yet while it lost support in theory, it retained 
influence in the everyday lives of men. Hall sought to change this. 
Like his colleague George M. Beard, a pioneer in neurasthenics, 
Hall believed the “increased pace and technological advancement 
of modem civilization” had exhausted men’s “nervous force” by
82 Bederman, Manliness and Civilization, 43.
83 Chambers, Tyrrany, 33.
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holding their passions in excessive check.84 In a culture that 
elevated the "labor of the brain” over “that of the muscles,” Hall 
feared that turn-of-the-century men had weakened their bodies by 
overcultivating their minds to meet the growing demands of 
civilization.85 Society’s cultivation of the intellect at the expense 
of the body had resulted in a drain of men’s vigor, rendering them 
effeminate, feeble, and exhausted. Appalled at this development, 
Hall sought a new method for raising middle-class boys with 
enough strength to withstand civilization and its attendant decay.86
Hall tried to resolve the paradox of civilization and 
neurasthenia by advocating recapitulation theory. The erstwhile 
civilization discourse had framed society’s advance in 
dichotomous terms, pitting civilization against barbarism in 
elevating whites above “inferior races.” But Hall’s understanding 
of the problems facing American men led him to the 
uncomfortable conclusion that under such a framework, greater 
civilization would ultimately lead to neurasthenic ruin. Rather 
than despair of this prospect, Hall took the debate in a different 
direction. Where his predecessors saw dichotomy, Hall saw a 
continuum between savagery and civilization capable of
84 Bederman, Manliness and Civilization, 85-7.
85 Beard distinguished neurasthenia as a problem unique to overcivilization by 
citing its disproportionate presence amongst those working at the “desk, pulpit, 
and counting-room” than “in the shop or on the farm.” George M. Beard, 
American Nervousness: Its Causes and Consequences (New York: G.P.
Putnam’s Sons, 1881): 26.
86 Bederman, M anliness and Civilization, 95.
46
replenishing men’s vigor. His project required intervention in the 
earliest stages of male development.
Hall believed the passion of young boys —a vestige of all 
men’s primitive past— represented the greatest hope for men in an 
overcivilized world. He looked with dissatisfaction at the current 
state of young boys:
Something is amiss with the lad of ten who is very good, studious, 
industrious, thoughtful, altruistic, quiet, polite, respectful,
obedient, gentlemanly, [and] orderly...Such a boy is either under­
vitalized and anemic...[or] a repressed, ...conventionalized 
manikin [sic].87
For Hall, this pathetic plight was the result o f excessive social 
programming at too early of an age. He maintained that the natural 
exuberance of young boys warranted cultivation to instill savage 
virtues such as physical strength, “feeling, emotion, and impulse,”
o o
to counter neurasthenia later m life. In fostering this passion, 
Hall instructed primary school teachers to promote the “half- 
animal” nature of boys in the classroom and on the playground. 
By thus transforming the principal mode of social conditioning, 
young boys would receive an inoculation against the “monoton[y]
o q
and narrow[ness]” of civilized existence.
87 G. Stanley Hall, Adolescence: Its Psychology and Its Relations to Physiology, 
Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education, 2 vols. (New 
York: Appleton, 1904): 2: 453.
88 ibid., 2:648.
89 ibid., 2:452; G. Stanley Hall and Arthur Allin, “The Psychology o f Tickling, 
Laughing, and the Comic,” American Journal o f  Psychology, vol. 9, (October 
1897): 17.
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Hall’s intent was not to produce a nation of primitive boys- 
turned savage men; it was quite the contrary. Drawing upon 
Darwin, Hall read into the development of each young boy the 
whole of human evolutionary history. It was precisely by allowing 
boys to revisit the savagery of their ancestors in youth that they 
could evolve from that primitive state throughout their lifetime to 
become civilized adults. This regression, Hall contended, would 
allow boys to rediscover the “missing links” of their distant past 
and amass the necessary character to combat neurasthenia as
90men.
Hall’s work with neurasthenia and recapitulation theory, as 
stated, served to undermine the assertions of women, especially in 
light of Gilman’s recent challenge to the civilization discourse.91 
But what, if anything, did it contribute to men’s uneasy perch 
between manliness and masculinity? The answer is complex. 
While Hall admitted a measure of passion and aggressiveness to 
the development of young boys, he seemed to retreat from the 
masculine ideal by doing it in the name of more healthy civilized 
men. Hall’s work provides an important beginning, but the full 
answer to how men negotiated the manly-masculine divide lies in 
the intricate politics of turn-of-the-century American imperialism.
90 Bedemian, M anliness and Civilization, 92-5; G. Stanley Hall, “Pedagogical 
Methods in Sunday School Work,: Christian Register 74 (November 1895): 
719-20.
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My introduction sheds brief light on the pressures President 
McKinley faced in navigating the dilemmas, both political and 
personal, preceding the Spanish-American War. However, in 
highlighting the context of his reluctant declaration of war, it 
abstained from recognizing the gendered debate that complicated 
his decision. The growing influence of women at the turn-of-the- 
century posed unique political problems. In fact, it is difficult to 
fully separate imperial policy from the emergent politics of gender 
at that time. In short, men faced a growing need to conceive 
politics in terms of “honor” due to growing feminist sentiments.92 
At the very least, the reality of this new political climate forced 
politicians to present their policies in a manner conducive to 
women’s growing influence. Men felt the pull of conflicting ideals 
and hence the need to navigate this divide with a newfound 
caution.
Jingoist imperialists like Senators Albert Beveridge and 
Henry Cabot Lodge, resting securely in the masculinist camp, 
viewed war in Cuba and the Philippines as an opportunity for
91 For a fitting sense of how Hall’s recapitulation theory assaulted conventional 
sensibilities by fostering boys’ primitive license, see “Dr. Hall’s Ultra Views,” 
Chicago Evening Post, 4 April 1899, 4.
92 For a thorough treatment of how gender politics “ground[ed] foreign policy 
decisions” in the tum-of-the-century United States, see Kristin Hoganson’s 
Fighting fo r  American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish- 
American and Phillipine-American Wars, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1998). In it, Hoganson argues that conventional explanations of U.S.
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“manufacturing] manhood” and rekindling “vigor” amidst
*
* 93 _  ,perceptions of male degeneracy. They seized upon concerns 
regarding the strength of male character to champion empire 
building as an opportunity to revive it. But while jingoist rhetoric 
suggests their intent to elevate masculinity above a worn-out 
tradition of manliness, there seems to be sufficient evidence that 
they needed to frame this desire in honorable terms.
In making the case for U.S. imperialism, many jingoists 
drew upon analogies that elevated Americans’ sense of honor 
above the arbitrationists’ calls for peaceful
resolution.94 Their motives likely rested with preventing the 
“character of the nation” from falling “to the unmilitary sex,” but 
this warranted disguise in the altered political climate of the late- 
1890s. To reach the desired effect, the jingo press often portrayed 
Cuba’s situation in chivalric terms. Cuban women became 
damsels in distress, requiring rescue by American knights, while 
Cuban rebels served as paragons of honor —brave, fraternal, and 
respectful— countering Spanish aggression, which sought to hold 
them in “bondage for lust and brutality.”95 In short, by portraying
imperialism fail to account for the impact of gender politics upon the U.S. 
decision to engage in these wars.
93 Albert Beveridge, The Young Man and the World, (New York: D. Appleton, 
1905): 338-42.
94 It is worth noting that the feminists allied rather predictably with the 
arbitrationists. Chambers, The Tyrrany o f  Change, 221-2.
95 Matthew Frye Jacobson, Special Sorrows: The Diasporic Imagination o f  Irish, 
Polish, and Jewish Immigrants in the United States, (Cambridge: Harvard
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imperialism in manly terms, jingoist illuminati were able to sell 
their masculine project of strengthening male character to a nation 
with a lingering insistence upon honor.
Despite the manly tenor many jingoists invoked, the overall
rhetoric of U.S. imperialism admitted seemingly sharp contrast
between the manly and masculine ideals. Beveridge’s call for
American imperialism helps illustrate this point:
The question for the young men of this Republic to decide is 
whether they will enlist with the Republican party, which is 
harmonious with all those natural elements of youth, of progress 
and of power and whose foreign policy is the policy of American 
advance, or with the Democratic party, which is at war with every 
constructive development of our civilization and whose foreign 
policy is the policy of American retreat.96
The challenge Beveridge posed laid bare the stakes of U.S: 
imperialism for men. Whereas American men had once felt free to 
decide matters by virtue of individual discretion and personal 
principle, they now confronted a political climate that challenged 
them collectively. This marked a shift from the deliberate 
character of manliness, to the masculine imperative of proving 
one’s self on the basis o f gender. In this sense, the imperial 
question played upon men’s self-consciousness to the point of 
supplanting their private judgement.
University Press, 1995): 161; Grover Flint, Marching with Gomez, (Boston: 
Lamson, Wolffe, 1898): 128.
96 Albert J. Beveridge, “The Young Men of America,” address of Oct. 18, 1900, 
Albert J. Beveridge Papers, LC, as quoted in Hoganson, Fighting fo r  American 
M anhood, 162.
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When hostilities in Cuba ended in July of 1898, an abiding
I
fear of male degeneracy served to justify America’s retention of 
the Philippines. , But the realities o f war soon belied their 
innocuous billing. Unfortunately for the jingoes, mounting disgust 
with the methods used to suppress Filipino rebels saw their 
emphasis upon manliness turned against them. Several problems 
conspired against the jingoes’ rhetorical scheme. The tropical 
climate, in addition to promoting untold diseases, brought 
perceptions of indolence and sensuality, prompting fears o f “evils” 
like prostitution, race-mixing, and outbreaks of venereal disease 
among American soldiers. Likewise, the army’s harsh methods of 
quashing the rebellion suggested a fall to barbarism. Almost 
overnight, the American presence in the Philippines deteriorated 
from “a glorious opportunity to build manhood” to an unintended 
path toward its destruction.97
In light of the mixed results of the imperial experiment, one 
might wonder why the imperial thrust was not abandoned 
altogether. The answer lies, in part, in the masculine ideal that had 
taken hold in preceding decades as a response to frontier anxiety 
and a revised political framework. The tenuous hold of men, 
evident in their declining influence throughout the 80s and 90s, 
prompted a sustained effort to retain some semblance of traditional
97 Goran Rystad. Ambiguous Imperialism: American Foreign Policy and 
Domestic Politics at the Turn o f  the Century, (Sweden: Berlingska
power. This self-consciousness prompted a headlong push, for 
better or worse, toward a more dignified status for men in the new 
national and international order. While the Spanish- and 
Philippine-American Wars were far from perfect, they were, after 
all, victories. As such, they were harnessed to help reinforce the 
otherwise declining position of American men.
The radical psychoanalysis of Alfred Adler sheds 
additional light on men’s masculine embrace of U.S. imperialism. 
Although his split with Freud came a decade in its wake, the fact
98that his theory of masculinity initiated this break is noteworthy. 
Adler began from the premise that all children, from the start, 
experience an internal polarity between the masculine and 
feminine. Because boys are relatively weak compared to adults, 
this subordination cultivates their feminine character as a 
counterbalance to the masculine. As they develop, however, in 
most contexts males learn a cultural preference for the masculine, 
as the feminine is most often associated with weakness. Neurosis 
follows as men reject their feminine character due to an abiding 
fear of physical weakness and inferiority. In Adler’s terms, this 
gives way to “masculine protest” as men “exaggerate the
Boktryckeriet, 1975): 23.
98 Adler and Freud parted ways in 1911 due, in part, to Adler’s disenchantment 
with Freud’s “mechanistic” theories of repression. Adler thought Freud’s 
Oedipus complex was merely a case in point of a larger dynamic of male 
neurosis, namely, “the masculine protest.” R.W. Connell, Masculinities 
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1995): 16-7.
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masculine through aggression and restless striving for triumphs.”99 
In the context of turn-of-the-century U.S. imperialism, psychology 
and history converged rather seamlessly. Jingoists played upon 
male neurosis and “masculine protest” to promote U.S. expansion 
while providing Adler a compelling case study in radical 
psychoanalysis.
That the masculine ideal survived its near collapse at the 
hands of imperialism is evident in how the U.S. resisted calls for 
reform by maintaining its claims to the newly-acquired territories 
of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Cuba following the 
war. Despite steadfast criticism from anti-imperialists, the U.S. 
proceeded with its “aggrandizing national design.” Only after the 
war effort did imperialists yield to anti-imperialist concerns that 
foreigners were unfit for self-government and thus a danger to 
American democracy. In doing so, prevailing attitudes of Anglo- 
Saxon superiority at home and abroad pre-empted calls for a just 
resolution of the political problems posed by U.S. expansion.
Rather than extend the rights of democracy to foreigners 
brought under its compass, the U.S. kept them at arm’s length by
99 Alfred Adler, “Psychologie der Macht,” Gewalt und Gewaltlosigkeit, ed. F. 
Kobler, (Zurich: Rotapfelverlag, 1928): 41-6, as discussed in R.W. Connell, 
M asculinities (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995): 16. In admitting 
radical psychoanalysis to the issue of men’s embrace of masculinity, I do not 
wish to elevate it above its historical context. A critical point of Adler’s 
analysis is that culture plays a significant role in associating the feminine with 
weakness. I would argue that as honor lost out to aggression in the final decades 
of the nineteenth century, the transformation afflicted the male subconscious.
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extending its demands for labor, markets, and hegemony without 
admitting territorial inhabitants as “participants] in the conduct of 
their governments].” As such, imperial policy embraced the 
longstanding prejudice that savage races could only be “uplifted” . 
and “civilized” through prolonged and patient exposure to their 
“racial superiors.”100 For the majority of American men, the 
newly tapped colonies could be of use to America without 
becoming truly American.101
The status of foreigners following the Spanish-American 
War reveals the emptiness of the manly rhetoric that fed U.S. 
imperialism. The new territories became, in effect, mere bases of 
extraction for natural resources and cheap labor capable of feeding 
aggressive American interests.102 Jingoists were unwilling to risk 
political clout by defending the lofty ideals originally put forth to 
sell U.S. expansion. In this sense, the plight of foreigners in U.S. 
territories revealed how both the imperial and anti-imperial camps 
came under the definitive spell of masculinity. As America 
pursued its imperial ambitions, it abandoned much of the discipline 
and restraint that ’ accompanied earlier policy considerations.
To compensate for their perceived inadequacy, men harnessed masculinity as a 
means to discounting the feminine in both themselves and their culture.
100 Matthew Frye Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters 
Foreign Peoples at Home and Abroad, 1876-1917. (New York: Hill and Wang, 
2000): 225.




While the decision to do so brought forth a host of unhappy results, 
American men could overlook these so long as they found 
consolation in this trade-off. Men’s honor suffered but they had 
already learned the limits of manliness. Accordingly, they further 
embraced a masculine construction of manhood capable of 
reasserting the Control that manliness no longer provided.
In short, the close of the nineteenth century featured 
American men at a crossroads. Traditional standards of manhood, 
emphasizing honor and virtue, were ill suited to the new challenges 
facing men. Women asserted their growing influence, in part, to 
compensate for men’s abdication of traditional manliness. 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman reinforced this trend by challenging the 
discourse of civilization to harness women’s overlooked potential. 
Threatened by this prospect, men sought fresh alternatives for 
maintaining their traditional power. G. Stanley Hall seized upon 
this opportunity to resolve the paradox of civilization and 
“neurasthenia” by promoting the primitive impulses of boys. For 
its part, U.S. imperialism revealed the gendered nature of turn-of- 
the-century politics. And while expansion posed new problems, it 
granted men greater control as consolation for their diminished 
place in society. Men embraced imperialism, in part, as an 
opportunity to restore their damaged egos and retain a semblance 
of their traditional cultural authority. Asserting themselves as
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such, men effectively countered the challenges of women while 
affirming their preference for masculinity as the defining standard 
of American manhood.
Poor William McKinley; how could he have known? His 
country had changed so much in a single generation, no wonder he 
seemed overwhelmed by the situation he confronted. The very 
standards of honor and restraint that had served him so well in his 
rise to power became, rather abruptly, liabilities to effective 
leadership. Late-nineteenth century men faced new challenges, 
which demanded new standards of manhood. The closing of the 
frontier had forced them to confront the limits of their 
independence and re-conceive their relationship to the country as a 
whole. Not surprisingly, they adapted to this change by trying to 
retain as much of their traditional authority as possible; distinctions 
of race, class and gender thus pervaded this transformation. 
Industrial capitalism emerged alongside democratic conservatism 
to turn these distinctions against the majority of men by elevating 
property rights above the inherent value of the individual. Men 
now confronted a new political climate that rendered them self- 
conscious, either as subjects or beneficiaries of industrial 
capitalism. Women employed, their newfound influence to 
denounce mounting obstacles to traditional manhood. But rather
than join forces with women and other less powerful social groups, 
men proceeded along the path of distinction in an effort to console 
their damaged egos. Imperialism promised to restore their 
tarnished manhood, but only with assaults upon their honor. 
Nonetheless, men embraced it, warts and all, in an attempt to 
prevail amidst a backdrop of loss. In doing so, men solidified their 
turn from a manly ideal of restraint and honor toward a masculine 
ideal of aggression in late-nineteenth century America.
58
